Me. Dick Ng Sui Wa, chairman de l’ICTA qualifie le jugement « d’excellent »
Rs 554,139,900 accompagnés des frais et intérêts. C’est ce qu’un jugement de Mme en cour Suprême prononcé le 10 août 2017, par la juge A. F. Chui Yew Cheong, avait ordonnée à Mauritius Telecom et à l’Information and Communication Technologies Authority de verser conjointement et « in solido » à son principal concurrent à Maurice, Emtel.
Mais hier, à la faveur d’un jugement sans précédent en appel, cette fois, prononcé par le Chef Juge qui est parti à la retraite hier matin, Asraf Caunhye et le juge N. F. Oh San-Bellepeau, Emtel a été débouté. Par conséquent, c’est Emtel qui n’aura pas droit à ces multitudes de millions de roupies mais au contraire, c’est la compagnie située à Ebène qui devra encourir les frais et Mauritius Telecom, Cellplus Mobile Communication Ltd, le Ministère des TIC et l’ICTA en sortent comme les grands vainqueurs de cette joute passionnante en justice. Ils ont toutes les raisons de se frotter les mains après un jugement en appel pareil que Me Dick Ng Sui Wa, chairman de l’ICTA a qualifié « d’excellent à tout point de vue ». Il a tenu à féliciter les hommes de loi de l’ICTA pour le travail colossal effectué pour que la justice triomphe au bout du compte. Du côté de Mauritius Telecom également, la satisfaction est de mise et les hommes de loi de la compagnie de téléphonie mobile ont fait l’objet d’éloges fortement mérités.
Il convient de souligner au prime abord que l’ancien chef juge et le juge Bellepeau ont révélé des points qui ne sont pas juste dans le jugement de Mme A. F. Chui Yew Fong. D’ailleurs dans cette même affaire, le ministère des TIC tout comme l’ICTA avaient aussi interjeté l’appel contre le jugement de Mme A. F. Chui Yew Fong.
Lors des plaidoiries, les hommes de loi de l’ICTA d’abord (Mes E. Ribot, Senior Counseil, L. E. Ribot, V. Daruty-Ribot et N. Dookhit et P. D. Lallah, avoué, devaient arguer que Telecom Authority était simplement un département du gouvernement ou une partie du bras exécutif de gouvernement et était sujet aux directives du gouvernement. Par conséquent, le procès aurait dû être intenté à l’Etat et non au Telecom Authority surtout que ce n’est qu’après la promulgation des lois en 1998 et 2001 que la nouvelle Mauritius Telecommunications Authority et l’ICTA ont été crée comme des Body Corporates et pouvaient être poursuivis en leur capacité de « statutory corporation ». De ce fait, Emtel a eu tort de poursuivre la Telecom Authority. Plus loin dans le jugement, on peut lire que ni l’ICTA ne pouvait être tenu responsable des actions ou omissions. Les avocats de l’ICTA et de la MTA ont aussi fait ressortir que le besoin de jouir de l’immunité est important vu qu’elles sont des entités gouvernementales. « The learned Judge had in fact delivered the interlocutory judgment on 25 July 2011 and not on 11 July 2011. But neither in that interlocutory judgment nor in the appeal to the interlocutory judgment was the issue of lack of legal personality of TA, as raised by ICTA during trial, examined or determined. The only issue which was raised by way of a plea in limine and adjudicated upon in relation to ICTA in the said interlocutory judgment, and subsequent on appeal, was whether the word “act” in the transitional provision of the 1998 Act and the 2001 Act also included “omissions”. It had been submitted that since the transitional provisions provided that it was on “every act done by, or in relation to” the Telecommunications Authority that would be deemed to have been done by the newly sett up Authority, these transitional provisions did not cover the various alleged “omissions” avered by Emtel in its plain against the TA. (…) “The learned Judge therefore clearly misdirected herself when she held that the issue raised at the trial had already been decided in the interlocutory judgment and the related appeal, as a result of which ICTA should be held liable pursuant to the transitional provisions for tortious acts, if any, of TA.”
Dans la conclusion du jugement, le chef juge et le juge Bellepeau écrivent ceci : “The civil claim in tort, as couched, could not be entered against ICTA since, for the given reasons, no such action could, ab initio, lie against TA. The TA was not a body corporate nor did it have the attributes required of a “personnalité juridique” which could be sued in respect of a civil claim in tort. “…) The initiation of civil proceedings against ICTA was thus flawed from the outset. There was no valid cause of action which could be entertained by Emtel suing TA by way of a civil action in tort in respect of the alleged acts and omissions of TA. There was, as a result, no liability which could accrue against ICTA by virtue of the transitional provisions embodied in the 1998 Act and the 2001 Act. We accordingly allow the appeal by ICTA and quash the order in the judgement for ICTA to pay any damages, interests and costs. Emtel shall bear the costs of this appeal.”
De même écrivent l’ancien chef juge et le juge Bellepeau dans le jugement donnant gain de cause à Mauritius Telecom Ltd, (…)
« In fact, Emtel itself did, as far back as 19 December 1996, in its application for an order of mandamus against TA, pray that TA should be directed: “(iv) … to ensure that such interconnect fees are paid as from 15th March 1996, and that the licence issued to [Cellplus] on 5th of September 1996 granting a three year exclusivity period on the use of the GSM technology to [Cellplus] is made to take effect as from 15th March 1996” (soulignés par les Juges)
“Emtel’s contention in respect of the criminal liability of the acts of Cellplus or MT had never been spelt out as such in its Statement of Claim, nor was it the subject of any determination by the trial Judge. We are not concerned in the present matter with the criminal liability of MT or Cellplus. Emtel had brought an action in tort and for Emtel to succeed in that respect it would need to prove that the commercial activities of Cellplus during the period March to September 1996 constituted an “acte fautif” within the purview of 30 article 1382 of the Civil Code on account of the fact that it did not hold a licence during that period. This had neither been specifically part of Emtel’s action in tort which as it has been seen was pursued essentially on a breach of the licence conditions as embodied in the press communiqué, nor has it been the subject of any determination by the trial judge. In any event, it has not been shown how Cellplus or MT can be found tortiously liable for carrying out commercial services during that period in the teeth of a valid and lawful amendment of Cellplus’ licence which on the face of it endorsed the legitimate exercise of commercial services from March 1996 to September 1996. We therefore consider that the learned Judge erred in awarding damages in respect of losses claimed by Emtel for the period of March 1996 to September 1996. We accordingly allow the appeal for the given reasons and quash the judgment ordering the appellants to pay to Emtel the sum of Rs 554,139,900 with interests and costs. The case for Emtel as set out in its Statement of Claim at para. 17, 17.1 and 18 was arguably based on the broader averments of “the concerted actions of Mauritius Telecom and Cellplus and the abuse of the dominant position of Mauritius Telecom” as well as the cross-subsidisation procured by Mauritius Telecom to Cellplus. This coupled with the failure of the TA to ensure that the conditions of the licence were met, enabled Cellplus to compete unfairly with Emtel. As has been seen however, the case was determined by the Judge on the basis of liability on account of the breach of licence conditions constituting the “acte fautif” and use of unfair means which caused prejudice to Emtel. In the circumstances, we are of the considered view that it would be just and fair that a non-suit, instead of a dismissal of Emtel’s claim, be ordered.”
Tant du côté de l’ICTA, Mauritius Telecom, représenté par Mes R. Chetty, Senior Counsel, Y. Reesaul, U. Burtun, K. Chetty et A. Vyapoory-Naiken et André Robert, Senior Attorney, Celleplus Mobile Communications Ltd, représenté par Mes D. Basset, Senior Counsel, N. Patten, J. G. Basset et H. Dhanjee et le ministère des TIC, on a toutes les raisons d’afficher la satisfaction après ces deux jugements, qui sans doute sont désormais des références.
Notons que ce sont Mes M. Beasley, QC, A. Moolan, Senior Counsel, E de Spéville et T. Koenig, Senior Attorney défendaient les intérêts de Emtel lors des travaux en appel alors que le ministère des TIC avait Mes L. Aujaheb, alors Assistant Solicitor General, K. Dwarka, State counsel et Me S. Angad, Principal State Attorney pour le représenter.
